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STATEMENT OP ISSUES
This Reply Brief on behalf of James V.

Eidson and

Kathryn Eidson, his wife, Defendants and Appellants in this
matter, hereinafter usually referred to by their surname, is
written to address new matters raised in the Brief of Respondent•
Upon learning of the new matter, especially concerning some very
basic information of which Eidson had never been informed, legal
counsel was retained to address the Court in regard to these
issues.
The Court below granted Summary Judgment on or about
July 27, 1987, based upon the record before it.

On August 10,

1987, in a Motion in which Mr. Eidson expressed "bafflement",
Eidsons indicated their lack of an understanding as to how it was
that the Judgment was granted against them and their desire to
appeal.
without

The appeal process was begun, formally,
further

inquiry

apparently

by the Court or counsel

for the

Plaintiff.
The Eidsons filed an "Appellants' Brief".
responded.

Plaintiff

Pursuant to that response, Eidsons learned that it

was not an oral motion which led to the Summary Judgment, but
that a Motion with Supporting Affidavits had been filed with the
Court.

These Affidavits, and, therefore, their content, were

unknown to Eidson,
Appellants7 Brief.

and,

therefore not dealt with

in the

As a result, the Affidavits which were before

the Court provide Eidsons with new matters to be dealt with in
2

this Reply Brief, as does the issue in regard to their failure to
respond.

Those new matters, and issues arising therefrom shall

be dealt with in this Reply Brief.
The key issue before the Court remains:
doubt

or uncertainty

concerning

questions

Is there any

of

fact,

and,

therefore, a genuine issue of material fact in the Plaintiff's
action?

If so, the Court below erred in granting the Motion for

Summary Judgment against Eidsons.

Sub-issues for consideration

are:
A.

Was the Affidavit of Chris Evans, on behalf

of Plaintiff Garfield Credit Union, sufficient under Rule 56
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to establish evidence
upon which Summary Judgment may be granted?
B.

Should the Court have given consideration to

the pro se answer filed by Mr.

Eidson at the time it

considered the Motion for Summary Judgment?
"Failure

to Respond"

to the Motion

Does Eidsons'

with

Supporting

Affidavits for Summary Judgment require the Court below to
grant Summary Judgment?
C.

Is there any evidence of jurisdiction over

Mrs. Eidson?
The new information gained in and as a result of the
Respondent's Brief requires a review of it, and its impact upon
the arguments previously made, pro se, by Appellant Eidson.

The

indulgence of the Court in the interest of substantial justice is

3

respectfully requested.

Through this Reply Brief, the legal

issues should be adequately addressed, to enable the Court of
Appeals to rule.

RULE 56, UTAH RULES OP CIVIL PROCEDURE
(a) For claimant.
A party seeking to recover
upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a
declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration
of 2 0 days from the commencement of the action or after
service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse
party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a
summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion
shall be served at least 10 days before the time fixed for
the hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing
may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law.
A summary judgment,
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of
liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the
amount of damages.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony;
defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall
be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to
the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of
all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit
shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court
may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by
depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further
affidavit. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not
rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings,
but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond,
summary judgment, is appropriate, shall be entered against
him.

4

STATEMENT OP CASE
It is unnecessary to restate the description of the
case.

Appellants7 Brief, filed pro se, essentially reviewed the

pleadings of which Eidsons were aware at the time that the Brief
was filed.

Respondent's Brief generally described that which has

taken place, procedurally.

However, certain information was

misstated or not stated at all in the Respondent's Brief.

The

Eidsons object; and accordingly offer the following corrections
for consideration by this Court, as a necessary part of its
understanding of the case as it relates to the issues before this
Court:
1.

Mr.

Eidson signed and timely filed pro se an

answer, to the Complaint of the Credit Union.
2.

In that Answer,

Eidsons raised defenses with

detailed testimonial pleading in regard to the facts known to Mr.
Eidson.

The affirmative statements clearly raised factual issues

in regard to the Complaint of the Credit Union.

Key among them

were issues in regard to the repossession of an automobile, with
his cooperation, by the Credit Union, and questions in regard to
the amount remaining due, based upon his belief that he had made
payment in full of the smaller Promissory Note complained of.

He

also noted that the allegations were technically incorrect in
regard to the Promissory Notes.
3.

Plaintiff's Complaint

incorrectly

stated

the

interest rates which applied to the Promissory Notes as they had

5

originally been signed.

The allegations of the Complaint were

inconsistent with the exhibits, on their faces.
p.2, and exhibits)

(See Complaint,

The effect was that eighteen (18%) percent

interest was applied to the larger note with the face amount of
Eight Thousand

Five Hundred Forty-Two

despite the fact that

($8,542.00) Dollars,

the Note attached to the Complaint clearly

called for fourteen (14%) percent interest.
granted on this basis.
4.
Evans was

Judgment was also

(See Point 5, below, also.)

As noted by Respondent, an Affidavit of a Chris

filed

in connection with the Motion

Judgment by the Plaintiff

Credit Union.

for Summary

Because

of

its

importance, a copy of the Affidavit is attached to this Brief.
Eidsons did not receive the Affidavit of Chris Evans, or the
other pleadings concerning the motion.

(See Eidsons7 August 10,

1987, Motion for Appeal and Docketing Statement dated September
25, 1987, paragraph 4.)
[Plaintiff, in its Respondent's Brief, submits to the
Court that these pleadings were sent to Eidsons " * * * at the
same address which is still listed in all Appellant's pleadings."
(page 3)

However, this is clearly not the case.

Appellants'

Brief, for example, spells "Bellerive" differently, and also
indicates Normandy as the city, rather than St. Louis, and sets
forth a zip code.

There has been no opportunity to present

evidence in regard to the potential impact of such differences.
There is also no sworn evidence before the Court that the

6

pleadings in question were actually mailed.

There is a signed

Mailing Certificate in the file indicating that it was sent, and
signed Motion and Docketing Statements indicating that it was not
received.]
5.

Contrary

to

the

implication

made

in

the

Respondent's Brief (page 3 ) , there was no evidence before the
Court in regard to which interest rate was applied to which
Promissory Note indebtedness, despite the fact that it is clearly
indicated that two separate Notes had been signed and that two
separate interest rates had been applied.

See the Affidavit of

Chris Evans, wherein such evidence should be, but is not, found.
The Judgment incorrectly indicates that eighteen (18%) percent
interest is and be applied to the larger Note, as indicated
above.
6,

The Plaintiff Credit Union, in Respondent's Brief,

(page 2) asserts that payments by Eidson "were not timely made"
and that, therefore "they were applied mostly to accrued interest
* * * ".

There is no evidence in regard to this statement in the

record before the Court.

Rather, and to the contrary,

the

statement of Chris Evans in paragraph number 11 of her Affidavit
(page 4 thereof) , and the statements of Eidson in his pleadings
(Answer, page 2, paragraph 6) indicate only that payments were
made by payroll deduction until the employment of Mr. Eidson at
Kennecott was terminated by reduction in force.
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It

is the position

of Eidsons that the

relevant

evidentiary facts, upon which the determination of the Court
below should have been made, are set forth in both the pro se
answer signed and filed by Eidson and the Affidavit of Chris
Evans on behalf of Plaintiff Credit Union, filed in connection
with the Motion for Summary Judgment.

The Motion for Appeal,

filed on August 10, 1987, by Mr. Eidson should also be taken into
consideration in connection with its statement in regard to what
had been received.
No Statement of Facts will be made in this Brief.

To

do so would be repetitious of the issues raised in argument,
below.

The Justices of the Court are respectfully encouraged to

thoughtfully review that which was before the Court below at the
time that the Motion for Summary Judgment was filed, especially
those portions referred to below.

SUMMARY OP ARGUMENTS
Plaintiff failed to satisfy the requirements of Rule 56
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and, therefore, was not
entitled to Summary Judgment upon the motion made and pleadings,
together with Affidavits, in the file.
as to material fact.

There are genuine issues

At the least, issues remain which are

unresolved by the evidence which was before the Court, in regard
to the question as to whether or not the collateral vehicle of

8

Eidson had been repossessed, and also in regard to the accounting
for payments made by or on behalf of Eidson.
The Affidavit of Chris Evans, as it applies to the
repossession issue, does not meet the standard set forth in Rule
56(e).

The statements made in regard thereto (paragraph 10, on

page 4) are made without personal knowledge.

It does not set

forth facts which would be admissible in evidence, but rather
refers to hearsay.

Further, no affirmative showing was made to

indicate that the witness was competent to testify as to the
matters stated in regard to the repossession.

Accordingly, the

Affidavit raised genuine issues of fact appropriate for trial.
The standard in regard to evidence was not met in
relation to the statements concerning accounting of payments.
Again, there was no affirmative showing that the witness was
competent to render an opinion in regard to the accounting.
Further, the best evidence of the record of payments would be
copies of the entries for the account of Mr.
Plaintiff Credit Union.

Eidson at the

Again, by raising the issues, questions

of fact and ambiguities were drawn before the Court.
The pro se answer signed by Mr. Eidson, and filed by
him with the Court,

raised

issues of

fact which were not

controverted by competent admissible evidence.

It is submitted

that, the said pro se answer, in its content, was tantamount to
an Affidavit, in that it contained factual information over the
signature of Mr. Eidson.

Under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of

9

Civil Procedure,

that pro se answer should have been given

consideration by the Court in the light most favorable to Mr.
Eidson.
Despite the failure of the Eidsons to respond to the
Affidavit and Motion, the Court had a duty to inquire fully into
the record to determine whether any genuine issue as to material
fact existed.

Further, the failure of the Eidsons to respond to

the Motion should be excused.

They did not believe that there

was any evidence before the Court to which they should respond.
The Court below had no evidence before it upon which it
could determine that jurisdiction existed against Mrs. Eidson.
No statements

in the Affidavit were made

in this regard.

Further, the response, filed pro se, by Mr. Eidson, clearly
indicated that that jurisdiction was disputed.

In addition,

genuine questions of fact exist for determination by the Court.
Accordingly, the Judgment of the Court below granting
Summary Judgment should be reversed.

ARGUMENT
Plaintiff failed to establish that no genuine issue of
fact exists, and, therefore, facts remain in dispute in the
matter before the Court.

The Court below erred in granting

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.
It is well established in Utah that:
Summary Judgment is proper only if the
pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admissions
show that there is no genuine issue of material
10

fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. If there is any doubt
or uncertainty concerning questions of fact, the
doubt should be resolved in favor of the opposing
party.
Thus, the Court must evaluate all the
evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly drawn
from the evidence in a light most favorable to the
party opposing Summary Judgment.
Bowen vs. Riverton City, Utah, 656 p.2d 434, 436 (1982), as
quoted in Frisbee vs. K & K Construction Company, Utah, 676
387 (1984).

P.2d

See also Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

In the matter at hand, the Court below had before it a
Complaint; a pro se Answer on behalf of Defendants, signed by
Defendant James Eidson,

setting forth affirmatively,

in a

testimonial form, factual information; and a Motion for Summary
Judgment, with Supporting Affidavits from Chris Evans and counsel
for the Plaintiff.
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is that
under which a Motion for Summary Judgment may be made.

At Rule

56(e), the standard for the evidence to be considered by the
Court, in an affidavit, is set forth.

It is stated:

Supporting and opposing affidavits shall
be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall
show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to
testify to the matters stated therein. * * * When a
Motion for Summary Judgment is made and supported
as provided in this Rule, an adverse party may not
rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his
pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as
otherwise provided in this Rule, must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial. * * * (Emphasis applied)
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A

Plaintiff Credit Union, in this matter, failed to

establish, hy compet.enL , adrni asible ev i dence ,

that no genuine

issue of fact existed.
The Plaintiff relied upon the Affidavit of Chris Evans,
a Collections Assistant Manager, to establish its case.

The

Affidavit indicated that Ms. Evans was personally familiar with
the account, in her capacity in the collections department.
laid no other foundation for the statements made.

It

Yet, the

Affidavit recited information in regard to an accounting by
application of variables such as interest rate, time, and receipt
of numerous payments,

Ms. Evans also responded to the Answer

filed by the Defendants, the Eidsons.

(Paragraphs 7 through 13,

Affidavit of Chri s Evans )
Ms. Evans did not establish, affirmatively, as required
by Rule 56(e), that she is competent to testify i:: regard to the
subject matter.

FOJ example, she stated that the collateral

automobile had not been repossessed by the Plaintiff to the best
of her knowledge.
Evans.)

(Paragraph 10, page 4, Affidavit of Chris

However, she did not indicate the period of time during

which she had been employed by the Plaintiff Credit Union.
Affidavit was signed on June 4, 1987.

The

The repossession of the

automobile is alleged in the Eidson's Answer ("to which she refers
in her Affidavit) to have taken place on approximately October
16, 1982

There is no indication that she was employed by the

company at that time, or had personal knowledge in regard to the

12

facts surrounding the alleged repossession of the automobile.
(She refers to knowledge about an investigation to located the
collateral.

However, it is clear from a reading of paragraphs 10

and 12 of that Affidavit that the investigation took place in
1986 or 1987,

long after the alleged repossession.

therefore, indeterminative.)

It is,

There is no indication as to the

degree to which the repossession question was investigated by the
Affiant.
Ms. Evans' competence was not established in regard to
the accounting, either.

Although she indicated that she was

familiar with the loan account, she provided no evidence which
would indicate that she is competent to provide an accounting.
Serious questions are raised in regard to the amount of interest
which would

appropriately

accrue against the debts.

The

Complaint and the Affidavit of Chris Evans each indicate that
eighteen

(18%) percent

interest would

accrue

against

principal balance remaining due on the Eight Thousand

the
Five

Hundred Forty-Two ($8,542.00) Dollar Promissory Note dated March
17, 1981.

Eidsons' Answer denies the allegation, and points out

the apparent mistake.

A review of the record clearly indicates,

by reference to the copy of the Note, itself, that fourteen (14%)
percent interest should have accrued against that amount.

No

foundation is set forth in the Affidavit which would indicate
that Ms. Evans calculated the interest or, if so, upon which
basis the said interest was calculated.

13

The Summary Judgment

which was ordered indicated that eighteen (18%) percent interest
may have been applied to that debt

The best evidence of the

standards by which the balance should have been calculated is the
Promissory Note, itself, which was on the record.

The testimony

of the Plaintiff's witness, Chris Evans, thus raised an ambiguity
on the record.
Further, the Affidavit of Ms. Evans did not indicate
the extent to which she investigated receipts by the Plaintiff
Credit Union in her work to establish the payments which were
received

Affirmative allegations were set forth in the Answer

filed pro se by Mr. Eidson which were uncontroverted in the
Affidavit of Ms. Evans. Accordingly, factual issues remained.
Finally, as to the account:! ng sworn to by Ms. Evans in
her Affidavit, another ambiguity is created.

Ms. Evans refers to

an accounting in regard to the Note dated November 20, 1981, in
the first paragraph 11 of her Affidavit, on page 4.

By reference

to the Complaint, to which a copy of the Note is attached, the
Court could determine that the Note was made in the face amount
of Eight Hundred Fifty ($850.00) Dol lars, on November 20, 1981,
which amount was to have been paid within thirty (30) days.

For

the sake of argument, we disregard the claim of Mr. Eidson that
the said Not
Ms.

Evans,

ull.

According to the statement of

after application of interest of eighteen

(18%)

percent, and four payments of Thirty ($30.00) Dollars, each, the
balance on that Eight Hundred Fifty ($850.00) Dollar Note had
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risen, in eight months, to One Thousand Four Hundred Ten and
74/100 ($1,410.74) Dollars.

There is no statement of facts which

would indicate a basis for the Six Hundred

($600.00) Dollar

increase.
It is the duty of the Court to " * * * evaluate all the
evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly drawn from the
evidence in a light most favorable to the party opposing Summary
Judgment * * * ",

at such time as it makes its decision.

(Frisbee, Supra, page 389.)

Further,

It is said that because of the drastic
potentials of a motion for summary judgment, it is
almost universal practice to scrutinize with care
and particularity the affidavits of the moving
party while indulging in some leniency with respect
the affidavits of the opposition. It has been held
that upon a motion for summary judgment, the court
must be critical of the moving papers but not those
in opposition.
(73 American Jurisprudence 2d, Summary Judgment, § 37, p. 7 64.
Citations omitted).
The Court below abused its discretion by failing to
examine, critically, or to scrutinize the Affidavit in Support of
the Motion of Summary Judgment.

As indicated above, Plaintiff

had failed to establish evidence, as required by the Rules,
sufficient to show that there was no genuine issue of material
fact.

Rather, as was the case in the Frisbee matter, supra the

Affidavit showed unresolved issues of fact.

There, an affidavit

made bare contentions and conclusions which were unsupported by
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any facts.

The Court ruled that conclusions were not sufficient

to support: summary judgment.

(page 390)

Finally, the evidence set forth in the Affidavit of
Chris Evans was not admissible in evidence.

At best, in regard

to the repossession of the automobile, it was made up of hearsay.
Evidence set forth in an affidavit which is hearsay is improper
to support a motion for summary judgment.

See Western States

Thrift and Loan Company vs. Blomquist, Utah, 504 P.2d 1019,
1020-21 (1972).
Based upon the

foregoing,

standards set forth in Rule 56(c)
Plaintiff.

it is clear that the
(e) were not met by the

Genuine issues of fact exist.

Although the failure

to respond was unintentional, it was unnecessary for a responsive
Affidavit to be filed on behalf of the Eidsons.

In the Frisbee

case, supra, at pages 389-390 the Court explained:
We have said that an opponent of a motion
for summary judgment must timely file responsive
affidavits raising factual issues or risk the trial
court's conclusion that there are no factual
issues. However, it is not always required that
the opposing party proffer affidavits in order to
avoid judgment against him. (Citations and quoted
language omitted.)
B•

I)efendant s E::i dson est ab 1 :i shed, throi igti t h e p r o s e

Answer in response to Plaintiff's Complaint#

that genuine issues

of fact remain in dispute.
Rule 56(c) ai id (e) require that the Court consider the
pleadings and affidavits on file, inter alia.

In (e), it is

indicated that " * * * mere allegations or denials * * * " shall
16

not be relied upon in opposition to a motion

for summary

j udgment.
The use and reason for this Rule is indicated

in

Thornock vs. Cook, Utah, 604 P.2d 934, 936 (1979), as indicated
in Respondent's Brief.
affirmatively

There, the Defendant in the action had

alleged duress as a defense.

However,

in

subsequent discovery, including, primarily, a deposition, she had
been unable
allegation.

to present

evidence which would

support

her

The Court appropriately concluded that she could not

rely upon the mere allegation made in her Answer and that summary
judgment, for that and other reasons, must be granted.
In the case before this Court, Mr. Eidson signed and
filed an Answer, pro se, which set forth numerous facts which,
although not sworn to,
personal knowledge.

were quite apparently made upon his

As the Defendant in the action, and the

person to whom those facts were familiar,
evidence would be admissible.
testify in those regards.

Mr.

if sworn to, the

Eidson was competent to

Accordingly, the standards of Rule

56(e) were satisfied in regard to the information set forth in
the Answer.
In the matter of Pentecost vs. Harward, Utah, 699
Pacific 2d 696, 697 (1985),

the Court held that a verified

pleading
* * * which controverted the facts set forth in
Harward's Affidavit, created a material issue of
fact for resolution at trial. We further hold that
even if Plaintiff's Complaint had not been
verified, the allegations of her Complaint that
17

were not addressed by Harward's Affidavit were
sufficient to support claims against him on several
theories.
In that case, no affidavit had been filed in response to that
supporting the motion for summary judgment.
Therefore, the pro se Answer which was signed and filed
by Mr. Eidson in this matter should have been considered by the
Court below as it scrutinized the case.

Under Rule 11 of the

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, his signature " * * * constitutes
a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion, or
other paper

r^at

to the best of his knowledge, information, and

belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in
fact * * *

"

A reading in the light most favorable to Mr.

Eidson would indicate that the statements were supportable by his
own, admissible testimony in regard to personal knowledge.
The rule that the party may not rely upon his mere
allegations

a nd c:ie n I a ] s,

distinguishable.

supported

Thornock,

supra,

Unlike the situation in Thornock, there was no

evidence before the Court that the Eidsons' allegations could not
be supported.

Further, in the Thornock case the allegation in

question was a mere allegation that there was duress.

In the

matter before this Court, the supporting facts were clearly set
forth in the pi eading signed by Mr. Eidson.
As indicated in the Appellants' Brief,

and above,

appropriate consideration to the Answer filed by Eidsons would
have led the Court to conclude that genuine disputed issues

18

is

remained, at least in regard to whether a repossession of an
automobile had taken place for which Mr. Eidson had not been
given credit; and as to whether or not the accounting of the
Plaintiff was accurate.
It is submitted that it is especially appropriate that
the Eidsons' pleadings be given weight under these circumstances,
where it is apparent from the evidence that the Eidsons did not
receive notice of the Motion

for Summary Judgment

or the

Affidavit in support thereof.
The Plaintiff apparently relies upon Eidsons7 failure
to respond to the Affidavit to support the conclusion of the
Court below.

Mr. Eidson, in the Defendants' Motion for Appeal

dated August 10, 1987, refers to his "bafflement" at the news
that Judgment has been granted, and indicates that he had not
received anything

in regard thereto.

He more

specifically

indicates the lack of notice or an opportunity to respond in the
docketing statement filed with this Court.

For these reasons,

the factual statements in Eidsons7 Answer should be considered by
the Court in a review to determine whether a question of fact
exists.
C.

The Utah Court has no jurisdiction

over Mrs.

Eidson, and the Summary Judgment should be reversed.
Defendants, in their Answer, deny that jurisdiction
exists against Mrs. Eidson, and, further, affirmatively allege
facts which would support that conclusion.

19

No evidence was

submitted by the Plaintiff which would indicate a basis upon
which jurisdiction could be established.

Accordingly, to grant a

Judgment against Mrs. Eidson on a Motion for Summary Judgment is
error.
Further, based upon the foregoing, even if the issues
were to be viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff,
there would be no basis for a Judgment against Mrs. Eidson.

As

indicated in the foregoing arguments, there remain genuine issues
of fact in dispute.

There would be no basis for a Judgment

against Mrs. Eidson under any theory submitted by Plaintiff, if
there is no Judgment against Mr. Eidson.
Plaintiff submits that Mrs. Eidson is not a party to
the Appeal

However, the Moti on for Appeal filed on August 10,

by Eidsons, pro se, clearly indicates the parties7 intent to
appeal the Judgment together.
for both,

The Appellants7 Brief was filed

The i ntent of the parties is clear, and ought to be

honored.

CONCLUSION
The record which was before the Court at the time that
Motion for Summary Judgment was heard, below, failed to establish
that there were no disputes in regard *-o issues of fact.

The

Affidavit

was

of Ms.

Evans,

on behalf of the Plaintiff,

insufficient: to estab] i sh those facts necessary for the Plaintiff
to prevail,

even assuming

they were uncontroverted.
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No

foundation was laid to indicate that the testimony was competent
in regard to the accounting information submitted to the Court.
The accounting, on its face, when compared with the documents
which form the basis therefor, raises issues of fact.
concerns the interest rate which should have been
Another concerns an unexplained Six Hundred

One issue
applied.

($600.00) Dollar

increase, over the course of eight (8) months, in an amount due
on a Note.

Further, Ms. Evans, in her Affidavit, refers to

issues raised by the Answer filed by the Defendant, and fails to
competently resolve those issues.
Likewise, Ms. Evans fails to establish that she is
competent to testify or that she has personal knowledge of facts
in regard to the claim of Eidson that the automobile which was
collateral for one of the loans was repossessed.

She submits

hearsay evidence to conclude that no repossession has taken
place.

The

Affidavit fails to establish that no issue of fact

remains, but, rather, raises factual issues in regard thereto.
Eidsons' pro se Answer ought to be given consideration,
as if it were an affidavit or verified answer to the Complaint.
It satisfies the requirements

in regard

to evidence

to be

submitted in opposition to a Motion for Summary Judgment, under
Rule 56(e), but for the fact that it is not made under oath.

It

clearly raises issues in regard to the repossession of the
automobile and the accounting done by the Plaintiff Credit Union.
The fact that no response was received by the Court, in the form
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of a counter-affidavit, is explained by the subsequent assertions
of Eidson that he did not receive copies of the Motion for
Summary Judgment and Supporting Affidavits.
The pro se Answer and the Affidavit, read together,
clearly indicated that issues of fact remain to be resolved in
this matter.
Finally, the Judgment against Mrs. Eidson should be
reversed for lack of any evidence in the record which would
indicate that the Court has jurisdiction over her.

Further,

there is no basis for a Judgment against Mrs. Eidson if, based
upon the foregoing, Summary Judgment could not be upheld against
Mr. Eidson.
It is apparent that the Court below failed to properly
scrutinize the evidence placed before it in support of the Motion
for Summary Judgment.

To grant the Motion for Summary Judgment

against Defendant under the circumstances and based upon the
evidence before it was error.

It is respectfully submitted that

the Judgment should be reversed and that the matter should be
remanded to the lower Court/*
DATED this ^ '

Attachment:

day of May, 1988.

Affidavit of Chris Evans dated June 4, 1987.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
,

.

GARFIELD CREDIT UNION
1

1 AFFIDAVIT OF CHRIS EVANS
!
Civil No. C-86-8607

Plaintiff,

I
(JAMES V. EIDSON and
MRS. V. EIDSON,

]
) Judge Pat Brian

Defendants,

]

I

STATE OF UTAH
)
j|
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
I
j
The undersigned, Chris Evans, being first duly sw<
.deposes and says:
I

1.

That

she

is

the

Assistant

Manager

in

charge

{Collections at Garfield Credit Union, the plaintiff in the al
entitled action.
il

2.

1-account

of

That

she

is

the defendants

personally
by

reason

familiar
of

her

with

the

position

with

(plaintiff.
I
Hto

3.
the

The defendants owe the plaintiff $6,907.51 pursi

promisory

note

dated

March

17,

1981

pursuant

to

plaintiff's First Cause of Action.

C'J'J

I

jA true and correct copy of this promisory note is attached he
"as Exhibit "A",
I

4.

The defendants further owe $1,779.40 as interes

jthe date of this Affidavit which was calculated at 18% per a
from July 19, 1982, and will owe further interest ast the rat
;18% per annum thereafter.
5.

The defendants owe the plaintiff $1,372.21 purs

,to the promisory

note dated November

plaintiff's Second Cause of Action.

20, 1981 and pursuan
A true and correct cop

this Promisory Note is attached hereto as Exhibit "B".
6.

The defendants further owe the amount of $934.7

interest to the date of this Affidavit calculated at the rat
14% per annum from July 19, 1982, and continuing at the rat
14% per annum thereafter.
|

In

response

to

Defendants

Answer

dated

January

1986, the Affiant responds as follows:
7.
Plaintiff's

Regarding

the

March

17,

1981

Promisory

First Cause of Action, the following

Note

payments

made and applied:
J
Date

I

Amount

Applied to
Principal

S04/21/81

$120.00

$0

.08/01//81

$600.00

$211.27

$120.00

$ 62.48

111/04/81

$120.69

$ 69.26

0.1/18/81

$120.00

$ 75.97

lh.2/02/81

$120.00

$ 76.38

Balance
$8542.00
(First payment was due
04/01/81)

•

;|l0/19/81
1

1

t

MO

Applied to
Date

Amount

Principal

12/18/81

$120.00

$ 70.62

01/06/82

$120.00

$ 61.87

01/18/82

$120.00

$ 83.57

02/02/82

$120.00

$ 74.95

|02/19/82

$120.00

$ 69.43

,03/01/82
,03/16/82
I 04/02/82

$120.00

$ 90.52

$120.00

$ 76.30

$120.00

$ 70.96

'04/16/82

$120.00

$ 80.01

j05/04/82

$120.00

$ 69.12

05/18/82

$120.00

$ 80.01

06/02/82

$120.00

$ 78.47

06/18/82

$120.00

$ 76.18

07/07/82

$120.00

$ 68.52

$7,976.02

$7,519.38

$7,663.83

$ 87.80
$6,907.51
$120.00
8. All of the foregoing payments were made pursua

07/19/82
the

Balance

defendant's

payroll

deduction

coming

from

his

empl

Kennecott Copper.

After July 19, 1982, no further payments

made by defendant

to plaintiff, either by payroll deducti

directly.

However, on January 23, 1983, a transfer was made

the defendant's

share

account

pursuant

to Utah

Code Anne

Section 7-15-7-9-33 in the amount of $276.11, all of which w<=
interest, leaving the balance the same at $6,907.51.
interest

has continued

to accrue at the contract

There<
rate wi

payments being made.
9.
admits
leaving

that

Even in Item 7 of Defendant's Answer, he imp
March

$5,904.00.

9,

1983

would

However,

have

according

been
to

his
the

last pa'
credit

u

records and statements, that principal amount was approximat

'$1,000,00 off, or $6,907.51 as heretofore referenced.
I
10. The repossession of defendant's pledged collat
as alledged in Defendant's Answer #12 never took place. Plain
over $300.00 in investigation costs to Mokan Cen
(spent
,Recovery of Blue Springs, Missouri to investigate and try
locate the collateral.
Mokan Central Recovery informed
Affiant that the car could not be located and that defenda
Wife had no knowledge of the collateral. To the best knowledg
•I
this Affiant, the collateral has never been repossessed
j|
I plaintiff nor voluntarily surrendererd or delivered by defen
"to
Plaintiff
Credit
Un
11. The following payments have been made on
November 20, 1981 loan of defendant, which is the subject
Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action:
Applied to
Date
Amount
Principal
Balance
04/02/82
05/18/82
06/02/82
06/18/82
07/07/82
07/19/82

$ 30.00
$ 2.85
$ 30.00
$ 0
$ 30.00
$ 16.51
$1,410.74
$ 30.00
$ 18.72
$ 30.00
$ 16.78
$1,372.21
$ 30.00
$ 21.75
11. The fo regoing is a complete, accur
the Plaintiff's Credit Union's records and statements of the
in Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action. Those payments were i
^pursuant to a payroll deduction from defendant's paycheck from
[employer at Kennecott. After July 19, 1982 no further paym<
[were made by defendant to plaintiff by either payroll deductio
otherwise. Interest has continued to accrue on the unpaid baL
lat the rate of 14% although no payments have been made.

12,

The reason plaintiff has taken so long in brin

action against the defendants is that plaintiff has been unabl
locate defendant until just recently.
was able to send an

investigator

It was then that plain

to inquire of the defend

regarding the collateral/ which could not be found.
13.

Both of the loans in the First and Second Cause

Action were taken out and signed by the defendant James Eidsoi
Garfield Credit Union in Salt Lake County, Utah.
DATED this Ar^ day of

crU^YO-

C\VU
CHRIS EVANS
/

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me
leva,
, 1987.

1987,

<r;v .i * iv_>
this ^-/^f>

day

^

NOTARY-PUBLIC residing At
Salt Lake City, UT
|My Commission Expires:

2-2*/-?/

/ « / *#

